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"No nation was ever ruined by trade,"
Benjamin Franklin (1774)'
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 30, 2002, the final decision was released in the case of
United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations".2 The
World Trade Organization arbitration panel report authorizes the
European Communities to levy $4.0433 billion in annual trade sanctions
against imports from the United States because of a provision in the U.S.
tax code. 4 "The FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act
of 2000", 5 the most recent of 40 years worth of half-hearted attempts by
the United States to comply with world trading body regulations, is the
current offender. According to the arbitration panel, the act subsidizes
foreign sales by U.S. corporations by relying upon export-based
contingencies, and is inconsistent with the obligations of the United
States under both the Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing
7
6
Measures ("SCM Agreement") and the Agreement on Agriculture.
The August 30, 2002 decision was the final determination of a January
14, 2002, WTO Appellate Panel report finding the United States'
extraterritorial income exclusion rules to be a prohibited export subsidy.
"This marks the fourth time in the past two and one-half years that the
United States has lost this issue, twice in the Foreign Sales Corporation
case and now twice in the ETI case."8 "There is no opportunity for the
1. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 225 (2002).
2. United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" Recourse to
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the

SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002), available at http://docsonline.
wto.org/gen-search.asp?searchmode=advanced [hereinafter Arbitrator Decision]. The
foreign sales corporation is hereinafter referred to throughout the comment and footnotes
as an "FSC."
3. All references to $ herein refer to United States dollars unless otherwise noted.
4. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 2423.
5. Id.
6. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement]; Annex IA, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS, 33 I.L.M.
1154 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
7. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN

GOODS, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
8.
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United States to appeal this latest determination." 9
President Bush is said to be in favor of complying with the ruling.
Kenneth Dam, Deputy Treasury Secretary, in testimony to the Senate
Finance Committee stated:
The President has spoken on this and his message is clear. The United States
will honor its WTO obligations and will come into compliance with the recent
WTO decision. To do so will require legislation to change our tax law. The
Administration is committed to working closely with the Congress in the
development and enactment of the leglation necessary to bring the United
States into compliance with WTO rules.

Just two years before, a WTO appellate panel held that the foreign
sales corporation ("FSC") provisions repealed in the 2000 Act constituted a
similar, prohibited subsidy." The Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act
("ETI") was promulgated by the Clinton administration as a response to
the FSC ruling under the guise of correcting the shortcomings of the
FSC legislation, and bringing the U.S. into compliance with its WTO
treaty obligations. 12 The expectation of success was short lived as just
two days after President Clinton signed the ETI Act into law, the
European Communities filed a request for consultations on the matter
with the WTO.' 3 Believing the ETI Act to be just as bad as its predecessor,
the European Communities determined the Act merely re4plicated the
offending provisions of the FSC rather than removing them.'

Press Release (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.way
sandmeans.house.gov/legacy/press/2002/bodydocs/4-9-02body.htm.
9. Id. \
10. Hearing on the WTO Decision on the ExtraterritorialIncome Exclusion
Provisionsand InternationalCompetitiveness Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Kenneth W. Dam Deputy Treasury Secretary),
available at www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/073002kdtest.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Dam].
11. World Trade Organization, United States-Tax Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DS I 08/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), [hereinafter FSC Appellate Report].
12. 2001 Trade Policy Agenda and 2000 Annual report of the President of the
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, U.S.T.R. (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.USTR.gov/reports200l.html. "The United States lost this case on appeal in
spring 2000, but repealed the FSC and enacted new legislation in November which
correct the shortcomings identified in the dispute."
13. United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," Recourse by
the European Communities to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of
the DSU, WT/DS108/13 (Nov. 17, 2000), availableat http://www.wto.org.
14. United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," Recourse by
the European Communities to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS 108/14 (Nov. 21,2000).
REVENUE MEASURES,

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As early as 1776, Adam Smith is on record for "condemning export
bounties as just another wasteful expedient of the mercantile system."' 5
While import tariffs have been imposed for centuries, the actual exercise
of defining and limiting "export subsidies," namely government incentive
programs that favor export sales over domestic sales, did not begin until
the nineteenth century. 6 "This task was originally inspired not by highminded notions of comparative advantage but by the mercantile notion
that subsidies might undercut 'legitimate' tariffs." 17
15.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 80, (J.
Rogers ed., vol. 2 1869) quoted in GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JOANNA
SHELTON ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 45 (1984).

16. A general definition of a subsidy is "an act by a government unit involving
either (1)a payment, (2) a remission of charges, or (3) supplying commodities or
services at less than cost or market price, with the intent of achieving a particular
economic objective, most usually the supplying to a general market a product or service
which would be supplied in as great quantity only at a higher price in the absence of the

payment or remission of charges."

UNITED NATIONS, A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

124 (1982), quoted in HUFBAUER & ERB, supra note 15, at 9.
17. HUFBAUER & ERB, supra note 15, at 45.
As a simplified illustration of the case for free trade, assume that Country A
decides it wants to stimulate exports by providing a subsidy of $25 per spool for
each spool of copper wire that is exported, provided that the exporter demonstrates
that it lowered the price of copper wire in the foreign market by the full amount of
the subsidy. XCo manufactures wire in Country A. It takes advantage of the
subsidy to lower the unit price of its wire in foreign markets by $ 25, resulting in an
increase in its exports. To meet the new demand, it hires some additional
employees in Country A. So far, the subsidy seems to be working.
A trade subsidy, however, is unlikely to have just one effect. Assume that
YCo is a domestic company that manufactures electric motors in Country A
and sells them domestically and abroad. Copper wire is a major component of
an electric motor. YCo's price for wire, which it buys from XCo, is not
changed by the export subsidy. Its foreign competitors, however, can now buy
copper wire at the subsidized price. As a result, they are able to reduce their
price for electric motors in Country A and in foreign markets, creating
competitive problems for YCo. As a result of the new competition, YCo
experiences a reduction in its domestic and foreign sales of motors and is
forced to reduce the number of employees at its production plant in Country A.
Whatever jobs were gained from the expansion of XCo's business might be
lost from the contraction of YCo's business. In addition, Country A is now
paying the bill for an export subsidy that probably has added no new jobs and
certainly has distorted normal trade patterns.
The above example may appear to be something of a special case. In a world
of floating exchange rates, however, an export subsidy is likely to have
negative effects on domestic production of unsubsidized products. The reason
is that an export subsidy is likely to cause an increase in the relative value of a
country's currency when currency exchange rates are set by the market. That
increase obviously would affect trade flows. In general, the changes in trades
flows would tend to wash out any economic benefits that a country would hope
to obtain from pursuing a beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy.
To illustrate the above point, assume that no companies in Country A
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[U]nbridled and competing national subsidies can undermine world prosperity.
Whatever the analytical merits of a purist free trade, turn-the-other-cheek
approach, the Great Depression taught the world that protective policies can
quickly and destructively spread from nation to nation. Because the concentrated
interests of producers command greater political support than the diffuse
interests of consumers, national governments find it much easier to emulate the
vices of protection than the virtues of free trade. This lesson has prompted the
international community to fashion guidelines that distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable national subsidy measures and to codify those
guidelines both in bilateral treaties and in multilateral agreements. In fact, a
major purpose of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is to

manufacture electrical motors or anything else using copper wire. In that case,
Country A would not have to be concerned that the export subsidy for wire
would harm its domestic industries directly. Because of the currency-exchange
effect, however, Country A almost certainly would be harmed by the export
subsidy. The subsidy, by increasing the demand for the products of Country A
in foreign markets, almost certainly would increase the value of Country A's
currency relative to other currencies. As the following example illustrates, the
expected result of the higher exchange rate would be an increase in imports
into Country A and a loss of jobs in the businesses in Country A that make
products in competition with the new imports,
The facts of this example are similar to the facts in the example above, with
the additional facts that Country A uses the dollar as its currency, and Country
B uses the franc. The exchange rate before the export subsidy for copper wire
was one dollar for two francs. After the subsidy was granted and exports of
wire increased, the value of a Country A dollar rose so that it now commands
three francs. Country B produces apples, which it sells for 30 francs a crate.
The price of apples in Country A is 14 dollars (28 francs at the presubsidy
exchange rate). Before the export subsidy caused the exchange rate to change,
apples produced in Country B were not competitive with apples produced in
Country A. After the exchange rate adjustment, however, a producer in
Country B that sold apples in Country A for 10 dollars a crate could convert
the proceeds into 30 francs. As a result, apples produced in Country B are now
competitive in Country A, and exports of apples from Country B should be
expected to go up. Producers of apples in Country A would lose sales, and jobs
in the apple business in Country A would be lost.
In the above examples, the violation of free trade by Country A produced a
bad result, for it and the rest of the world, even without any retaliation by
Country A's trading partners. The worldwide economic costs of Country A's
conduct would be magnified many times if other countries responded by
erecting barriers to trade or by adopting their own export subsidies. One of the
major purposes of the United States in helping to establish the WTO was to
keep countries from making themselves poorer by behaving like Country A.
Another major purpose was to prevent the almost inevitable disputes over trade
practices from escalating out of control."
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
2nd Session (2002) (statement of Michael J.McIntyre, Professor of Law, Wayne State
University), available at http://www.waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/srm/l07cong/410-02/4-10mcin.htm.

18
discipline protective import policies.

The existence of two basic systems of taxation around the world is not
addressed by the rules of the WTO,' 9 and some believe this omission
leaves U.S. corporations at a comparative disadvantage. The U.S. tax
system is different from the tax systems of the European countries; in
addition, the tax systems of the European countries differ markedly
among themselves. Across systems, two generally recognized grounds
exist for a nation to tax income. Firstly, the worldwide system provides
for jurisdiction over the recipient of the income based on the residence
of the taxpayer, allowing a country to tax the worldwide income of
persons subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the territorial system
provides for jurisdiction over the activity that produces the income,
where tax is due on income produced within the country's borders.
No country uses a pure form of either system; rather, all mix the principles
to varying degrees. The United States and approximately half of the
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
tax individuals and corporations within their jurisdiction under some
variation of a worldwide theory of taxation. To a U.S. citizen or business,
this means that all earnings are subject to taxation, regardless of the
location of the source of the earnings. Thus, an American citizen living
in the "tax free" Cayman Islands pays U.S. income tax on most of his
earnings just as if he were still domiciled in the United States, and that
same citizen, if living in Utah, would owe U.S. tax on his dividend
income from a company in Sweden.2 °
The territorial system taxes, in addition to home country earnings,
18.

HUFBAUER & ERB, supra note 15, at 8.

19. FSC Appellate Report, supra note 11, at para. 6.
For United States citizens and residents, the tax laws of the United States generally
operate "on a worldwide basis." This means that, generally, the United States
asserts the right to tax all income earned "worldwide" by its citizens and residents.
A corporation organized under the laws of one of the fifty American states or the
District of Columbia is a "domestic", or United States, corporation, and is "resident"
in the United States for purposes of this "worldwide" taxation system.
The United States generally taxes any income earned by foreign corporations
within the territory of the United States. The United States generally does not
tax income that is earned by foreign corporations outside the United States.
However, [under Section 882(a) IRC], such "foreign-source" income of a
foreign corporation generally will be subject to United States taxation when
such income is "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States."
Id. at para. 6-7.
20. Some additional tax breaks are available to American citizens domiciled
outside of the U.S. but the basic rules of taxation do not change based on domicile.
Similarly, a foreign tax credit may offset U.S. tax due on foreign dividends, but the
payment of the dividend itself remains a taxable event. See I.R.C. § 901 et seq. (West
2003).
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certain income, such as rent, earned outside of the home country (passive
income), and exempts actively produced foreign income.
Under a
territorial system, an individual or business only owes tax to the place
where the taxable event occurs, and the amount of tax owed is not based
on the taxpayers domicile.
Unlike other worldwide tax systems, the details of the U.S. system are
such that U.S. multinationals may be disadvantaged when competing
abroad against multinational companies established in other countries
using a worldwide tax system. "This is because the United States employs
a worldwide tax system that, unlike other worldwide systems, taxes
active forms of business income earned abroad before it has been
repatriated and more strictly limits the use of the foreign tax credits that
prevent double taxation of income earned abroad. 22
When a U.S. person pays income tax in a foreign country, a U.S. tax
credit is generally available to offset the foreign taxes paid, reducing the
amount of double taxation. 23 With exceptions, the United States essentially
taxes that foreign income only to the extent that the U.S. tax rate is
higher than the foreign rate.
The United States defines the residence of corporations for tax purposes
purely on the basis of place of incorporation.24 The U.S. system taxes all
income earned by U.S. corporations, regardless of where that income has
been earned or whether it was earned by a foreign branch office. ,
On the other hand, the United States generally exempts from direct
taxation all income of foreign corporations that has been earned outside
the United States. Foreign corporations are defined as all corporations
that do not fit the criteria of U.S. corporations; i.e., corporations
organized outside the 50 states and the District of Columbia.25

21. In the corporate arena, this thinking is often reflected in the idea of taxing
corporations on the basis of where they are managed, not merely on where they are
incorporated. As business structures become more complex in'a global economy,
determination of the place of effective management of a company can become more
difficult and can tax ambiguities, regarding tax treaty benefits or consolidated tax
returns, especially in countries like France with a territorial tax system. See Herve
Leherissel, The Tax Residence of Companies, 39 INT'L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION,
No. 4/5 (Apr. 1, 1999).
22. See Dam, supra note 10.
23. See I.R.C. § 901 et seq.
24. A U.S. corporation is defined in the tax code as one that is organized under the
laws of one of the 50 states within the United States, or the District of Columbia. Id. §
7701 (a)(4).
25. Id. §§ 7701(a)(4), 7701(a)(9).

The exemption of foreign corporations from direct U.S. income tax on
their foreign-source income applies even to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. The United States generally taxes income of such subsidiaries
only at the time it is transferred to the U.S. parent company in the form
of dividends. This period of exemption is termed "deferral" under the
U.S. tax system and theoretically can last indefinitely. Because of the
potential for tax avoidance, the United States has adopted a series of
"anti-deferral" rules that constitute targeted exceptions to the general norm
of deferral and respond to specific concerns. One of these rules is
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, which limits the benefits of
deferral for specific types of income earned by certain controlled foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies.
III. SUBPART F
In 1962, the United States Congress passed Subpart F of the United
States Tax Code.26 In part, the rule was created as a way to deal with the
distinctions created in the 1950s under the recently enacted General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") rules between direct taxes
such as the income tax, and indirect taxes such as value-added taxes.
Under the WTO agreements, direct taxes are not permitted to be borderadjustable. Therefore, the U.S. income tax is not rebatable on exports under
these rules. In contrast, indirect taxes are permitted to be border adjustable
under the WTO rules. Accordingly, the European value added27 taxes (VAT) may
be, and are, rebated at the border consistent with WTO rules.

This distinction matters partly because countries that use a VAT
depend on it for a significant portion of government revenue. 28 Again,
under WTO rules, the VAT is border-adjustable while other forms of
taxation (upon which the United States is heavily dependent) are not.
As an overly simplified example, assume Germany only taxes
consumption (through a VAT) and the United States only taxes income
(through a corporate income tax). In such a case, neither the German nor
the U.S. Treasury would receive revenue when a German manufacturer
exports a car for sale to the United States.29 When a U.S. manufacturer
26. Id. § 952.
27. Dam, supra note 10.
28. In the United States, consumption taxes, mostly in the form of state and local
sales taxes, account for approximately 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP). By
contrast, European Countries are much more heavily dependent on consumption tax
income ranging from a low of 6% of GDP in Italy to 11% in Iceland. Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, Background Materialson Business Tax Issues Preparedfor the
House Committee on Ways and Means Tax Policy Discussion Series, 23 (Apr. 4, 2002),
availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/x-23-02.pdf.
29. Joint Committee on Taxation, Impact on International competitiveness of
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exports to Germany, both governments would receive revenue. In the
example of the German company, VAT paid up until the time the car is
exported from Germany is rebated at the time of export. Upon import
into the United States, no income tax is due as the car left Germany at its
full retail value and thus no profit was made in the United States. The
American manufacturer pays income tax to the U.S. when it sells the car,
and VAT to Germany when it is imported. The income/VAT tax cost
for the American company to compete in Germany is higher than for the
German company to sell in the United States. This is true regardless of
any preference whether taxes should be paid by the ultimate consumer or
by a corporation's shareholder. The American company always pays
income tax while the German company pays VAT only for cars sold at
home.
The primary reason for subpart F's implementation was, according to
President Kennedy, to respond to what were perceived to be abuses by
American companies using entities in low tax jurisdictions to minimize
their current U.S. tax bills. 30 Congress was concerned that U.S. companies
were using offshore subsidiaries to shelter earnings of their foreign
operations from U.S taxes by selling goods to the offshore subsidiary at
prices generative of no income to the U.S. parent. Issues of international
competitiveness were not part of the debate.
Although proposals were advanced to eliminate deferral entirely,
subpart F was enacted instead, as part of the Revenue Act of 1962. 31 The
complexities of subpart F continue to haunt the United States today.32
The general principle of U.S. taxation prior to subpart F was that no
U.S. tax was due on foreign-sourced earnings of a foreign corporation
organized outside of the U.S. until the earnings were repatriatedinto the
United States.33 By basing foreign subsidiaries in low or no tax
jurisdictions this tax could be deferred indefinitely. Subpart F partly
closed this option by requiring corporations with at least one U.S.
Replacing the Federal Income Tax 98 (July 17, 1996), available at http://www.

house.gov/jct/s-5-96.pdf.
30.

See Franchise Tax Board of the State of California, Water's Edge Manual, §

9.1 (b), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/manuals/audit/water/WEMSec9 I b.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004).
31. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
32. See generally Ned Maguire & Stuart Anolik, Subpart F and Source of Income
Issues in E-Commerce,TAX NOTES INT'L, Oct. 23,2000, at 1935.

33.

See generally Richard A. Westin & Stephen Vasek, The Extraterritorial

Income Exclusion: Where Do Matters Stand Following the WTO Panel Report?, TAX
NOTES INT'L, July 16, 2001, at 337.

shareholder and 50 percent or more U.S. ownership to pay tax each year
on the passive investment income, as well as some active investment
income of their foreign subsidiaries, even if that income was not
repatriated.
Subpart F puts U.S. corporations further behind their foreign competitors,
by requiring immediate, instead of deferred, taxation on significant
amounts of foreign-sourced income before it is "repatriated and more
strictly limits the use of the foreign tax credits that prevent the double
taxation of income earned abroad. 34 No other country requires its
corporations to comply with such rules.
IV. THE DISC
Even before the creation of Subpart F, Congress subsidized exports
through the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation as a way to promote
U.S. exports after World War II by excluding exempt foreign trade
income from gross income. 35 In '1971,, Congress expanded the subsidy
by creating the Domestic International Sales Corporation ("DISC") 36 as
part of a package of economic and fiscal measures proposed by the
Nixon Administration to address the deteriorating U.S. balance of
payments.37 The DISC provided special tax treatment for exports by
deferring a portion of the income generated by the export activity.
To qualify as a DISC, a United States corporation had to meet specific
requirements, including that it be a domestic corporation, that 95 percent
of the corporation's gross receipts for each taxable year consist of
"qualified export receipts," and that 95 percent of the corporation's
assets at the close of the taxable year be "qualified export assets." A
U.S.' corporation qualifying as a DISC is not subject to U.S. federal
income tax on its current or retained export earnings. However, one half
of a DISC's earnings is deemed distributed to the shareholders of the
DISC and is taxable to those shareholders as a dividend. 38 This
essentially created a permanent tax deferral on one half of39the DISC's
earnings for as long as the company complied with the rules.
34. Herman P. Ayayo, Global Economy Heightens Needfor U.S. International Tax
Reforms, Treasury Official Says, TAx NOTES INT'L, Dec. 23, 2002, at 1194 (2002).
35. I.R.C. §§ 921, 922 (1954) (repealed 1976).
36. Id.§§ 991-97.
37. Eric Dorkin, Symposium: Part Three: Private Capital and Development:
Challenges Facing International Financial Institutions in a Globalized Economy, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 250 (1999).
38. A liability of shareholders to taxation on the retained earnings arises when one
of the following events occur: (a) there is an actual distribution of untaxed DISC
earnings, (b) the DISC is liquidated, (c) a shareholder disposes of the DISC's stock, or
(d) the corporation fails to qualify as a DISC for the taxable year. I.R.C. §§991-97.
39. Id.
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V. THE FIRST GATT COMPLAINT

Use of the DISC grew significantly to the point where in 1975, 70
percent of exports from the U.S. went through DISCs, and by 1977 it
was being projected that foregone taxes would amount to $1.580
billion.40 The European Community objected to the DISC and initiated
the first GATT complaint in February of 1972. 4'
The European Communities ("E.C.") claimed that the DISC violated
GATT Article XVI:4 of GATT 194742 which disciplines export subsidies.43
As part of its res onse, the United States lodged three cases against
European tax laws claiming that they implicitly subsidized exports by
failing to tax certain foreign-source income. All of these complaints
were assigned to one panel that issued rulings in 1976 declaring the tax
provisions of all four countries to be export subsidies.45
It was not until 1981 that the dispute was finally resolved with a
GATT Council Understanding worked out by the parties.46 It allowed
for the replacement of the DISC and stated that foreign economic
processes did not need to be taxed.47 The essence of the understanding
is that "[e]conomic processes located outside the territorial limits of the
exporting country need not be subject to taxation by the exporting
country and should not be regarded as export activities in terms of
40. International Economic Report of the President, quoted in Report of the WTO
Panel on DISC Legislation, at para. 17 (Nov. 12, 1976), availableat http://www.useu.be/
ISSUES/discl 176.html.
41. See Unpublished GATTr Panel Report, United States Tax Legislation (DISC),
I/4422-23S/98, 1976 GATIPD Lexis 2.
42. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter,
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which
subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic
market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope
of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the
introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies.
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT), art. XVI(4), enacted 1947,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, in DOCUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE 400 (The Bobbd-Merrill Co., Inc. 1976).
43. International Economic Report of the President, supra note 40.
44. The complaints by the United States were against France, Belgium and Italy
contending that if the DISC were an export subsidy, then the tax exemptions provided by
these countries for foreign-source income were export subsidies.
45. See FSC Appellate Report, supra note 11, at para. 20.
46. Id. at para. 22.
47. Id. at para. 95.

GATT Article XVI:4 [which disciplines export subsidies]. 4 8
In other words, the GATT Council adopted an interpretation clarifying
that non-taxation of income generated by foreign economic processes
was not a violation of trade rules. Although not actually vindicating the
DISC, it provided a guideline for how the United States could reglace
the DISC with a new tax measure that would be legal under GATT.
In 1984, Congress replaced the DISC with the Foreign Sales Corporation
("FSC") provisions. 50 The legislative history shows that both the Reagan
Administration and Congress read the 1981 Understanding as enabling
the United States to employ the FSC. The FSC was understood to meet
the terms of the Understanding because it exempts from taxation income
generated by foreign economic processes. Accompanying legislative
materials explicitly confirmed this intention.
Under GATT rules, a country need not tax income from economic processes
occurring outside its territory. Accordingly, Congress believed that certain income
attributed to economic activities occurring outside the United States should be
exempt from U.S. tax in order to afford U.S. exporters treatment comparable
to
51
what exporters customarily obtain under territorial systems of taxation.

48. The full text of the understanding is as follows:
The Council adopts these reports on the understanding that with respect to
these cases, and in general, economic processes (including transactions
involving exported goods) located outside the territorial limits of the exporting
country need not be subject to taxation by the exporting country and should not
be regarded as export activities in terms of Article XVI:4 of the General
Agreement. It is further understood that Article XVI:4 requires that arm'slength pricing be observed, i.e., prices for goods in transactions between
exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or the same control should
for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent
enterprises acting at arm's length. Furthermore, Article XVI:4 does not
prohibit the adoption of measures to avoid double taxation of foreign-source
income.
Id. at para. 94.
49. The Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies & Countervailing Duties settled the
four tax cases, based on four principles: (a) the distinction between direct and
indirect taxes was preserved; (b) The United States agreed to repeal DISC (tax
deferral was conceded to be an export subsidy, like tax exemption); (c)
however, methods of avoiding double taxation-both the exemption method
associated with territorial systems of taxation and the foreign tax credit method
associated with worldwide systems of taxation-are defined not to be
subsidies; (d) the arm's length pricing standard is to be observed in
transactions between parent exporting companies and their foreign sales
subsidiaries.
Gary Hufbauer, The FSC Case: Background and Implications (Feb. 27, 2002), available
at http://www.iie.com/papers/hufbauer0l02.htm.
50. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, §801(a) (1984).
51. See FSC Panel Report, supra note I1, at para. 333 (quoting from Staff Comm.
On Taxation, 98th Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, at 1042 (1985). The FSC was designed to cure the alleged
defects in the DISC by instituting an entirely different system, using a foreign, rather
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VI. COMPLAINT AGAINST THE FSC

In October 1999, 15 years after the FSC was enacted, a WTO panel
ruled that the 1981 Understanding was not brought forward into the
WTO and that, in any event, the FSC did not qualify under its provisions. 52
The U.S. Government maintained that the United States, the European
Community, and the GATT Council meant the 1981 Understanding to
have continuing force. The United States also argued that the FSC fit
perfectly within the parameters of the Understanding. 53 The United States
contended the drafters of the WTO did not intend to discard the old
rulings and precedents, and that the trade law status of offshore income
was determined in 541981 and was embedded in the new WTO rules
written in the 1990s.
The FSC scheme was not challenged for 15 years after its enactment
even though it accomplished essentially the same thing as its predecessor,
the DISC. A panel of the U.S. House of Representatives found no
complaints by European companies to prompt the dispute.5 5 Comments
were made in the U.S. Congress, when debating how to comply with the
WTO ruling, indicating that if the FSC regime were as anticompetitive
as it was made out to be that there should have been an outcry against it
by European manufacturers. However, there was not. Congress also
noted that the European Communities brought the action against the
FSC at a time when the European Communities had lost several rounds
of the "Banana" and "Beef" disputes in the WTO.56
than a domestic company, that would be compatible with all applicable GATT standards.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. One the United States chief complaints in the DSC case was that the WTO
panel erred in abandoning the 1981 understanding. Id. at para. 7.36. "Although the
United States argued forcefully that the FSC provisions were blessed by the 1981
Understanding, the WTO panel disagreed, concluding that the 1981 Understanding had
no continuing relevance in the interpretation of current WTO rules." Dam, supra note
10.
55. H.R. Rep. No. 106-845, at 14 (2000).
56. Id.
Turning to the actions of the European Union in this dispute, it is the
Committee's understanding that this dispute did not arise out of private sector
complaints, but instead was initiated by the European Union primarily as a
response to its losses in the so-called 'bananas' and 'beef disputes. Indeed, it
is the Committee's understanding that during the course of this dispute,
European Union officials failed, when asked, to provide a single example of
actual commercial harm suffered by a European firm as a result of the FSC
provisions. In light of this, the Committee finds the European Union's decision

VII. ENTER THE WTO
In 1994, as part of the founding of the World Trade Organization, a
new set of rules regarding subsidies was created- the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 57 ("SCM Agreement") of which
the United States was the major proponent. The WTO also introduced,
with U.S. encouragement, an enforcement mechanism that did not exist
under the GATT.
Frustrated with the GATT system, Congress wanted to improve the speed and
effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures. Congress
insisted on the opening of foreign markets, the elimination of trade-distorting
policies, and the establishment of a more effective system of international
trading disciplines and procedures. The dispute settlement mechanism was
established simply to ensure that the rules that countries agreed upon together
and pledged to abide by are actually enforced. But even when the U.S. loses a
case, the WTO cannot force change in U.S. laws, regulations or policies. The
WTO cannot strike down any U.S. law, as an American court can. WTO panels
merely determine whether disputed policies conflict with WTO rules and, if
they do, recommend that members bring those policies into conformity. The
disputing countries must
still resolve the matter themselves, often through a
58
negotiated settlement.

Unlike the cases in the 1970s and 1980s where the United States could
stall for years, under the new WTO rules the United States had to

to walk away from the 1981 Understanding deeply troubling and provocative
as well as threatening to the international trading system.
Id.
57. Article 1 1.1 of The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Defines subsidy as follows:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(l)
there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body
within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as
"government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of
funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not
collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general
infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts
or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of
functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be
vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs
from practices normally followed by governments; or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of
Article XVI of GATT 1994; and
(b)
a benefit is thereby conferred.
SCM Agreement, supra note 6.
58. DOUGLAs A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 189 (2002) (quoting from the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1011 (1988)).

Fishingfor Rainbows

[VoL. 5: 503, 2004]

SAN DIEGO INT'L L.

respond within a limited period of time or be liable for possible
sanctions.
VII. U.S. RESPONSE

In response to the WTO findings, the United States enacted the
FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 200059 on
November 15, 2000. The legislation fully repealed the FSC provisions
and adopted in their place the extraterritorial' income exclusion ("ETI")
scheme. The legislation was an attempt to bring the United States into
compliance with WTO rules by addressing the analysis reflected in the
WTO decision. At the same time, the legislation also was intended to
ensure that U.S. businesses not be foreclosed from opportunities in the
global marketplace because of differences
in the U.S. tax laws as
60
compared to the laws of other countries.
IX. ETI BASICS
Along with repealing the FSC provisions of the tax code,6 1 the ETI
Act attempted to change the code in what was claimed to be a novel and
fundamental way by redefining gross income. Prior to the change, all
income was assumed to be included in gross income unless specifically
excluded by a tax code provision.6 2 Under the Act, the definition of
gross income no longer includes extraterritorial income, and "becomes
the new normative benchmark for taxing income derived in connection
with certain activities performed outside the U.S. ' 6 3 Congress assumed that
once income was no longer included in the definition of gross income,
omitting that income from the tax base would not be a "prohibited
subsidy." The Senate Finance Committee report explains the U.S. view:
The Committee believes that, in order to ensure WTO compatibility, it is
important that the new regime not confer export-contingent benefits.
Accordingly, the Committee has determined that it is appropriate to treat all
foreign sales alike. The general exclusion, therefore, applies to foreign trade
income, whether the goods are manufactured in the United States or abroad, a

59. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
16-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
60. Dam, supra note 10.
61. I.R.C. §§ 921-27 (repealed 2000).
62. Id. § 61 ("Unless otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all
income from whatever source derived... .
63. S.Rep. 106-416 (2000).

substantially broader category of income than that which was exempted from
tax under the FSC provisions. A taxpayer would receive the same U.S. tax
treatment with respect to its foreign sales regardless of whether it exports.
The Committee notes that the extraterritorial income excluded by this
legislation from the scope of U.S. income taxation parallels the foreign-source
income excluded under most territorial tax systems, particularly those employed
by European Union member states. Under neither the U.S. tax system as
modified by this legislation nor many European tax systems is the income
excluded from taxation limited to income earned through exporting. At the same
time, under both systems, exporting is one way to earn foreign-source income
that is excluded from taxation, and exporters under both systems are among
those who can avail themselves of the limitations on the taxing authority of both
systems.
The Committee believes that this legislation, which fundamentally changes
the U.S. tax treatment of extraterritorial income, complies with the WTO
decisions and honors U.S. obligations under the WTO. 64

X. THE FINDINGS
On March 20, 2000, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")
recommended that the United States bring into conformity the measures
it found to be inconsistent with its obligations under the SCM
Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture and to withdraw the FSC
subsidies by October 1, 2000. The United States requested an extension
until November 1, 2000 and on November 15, 2000 signed into law the
FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000. As
stated previously, the United States believed that this resolution was
consistent with the United States' WTO obligations.
The European Communities immediately disputed the United States'
conclusion. Pascal Lamy, the E.U. trade commissioner, called the ETI
"even worse" than the FSC and stated that it continued to make income

64. Id.
65. The European Communities considered that the ETI Act did not comply with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and that it was not consistent
with the United States' obligations under the SCM Agreement, the Agreement
on Agriculture, and the GATT 1994. The European Communities therefore
requested that the matter be referred to the original panel pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"). On 20 December 2000, in accordance
with Article 21.5 of the DSU, the DSB referred the matter to the original panel.
The Panel Report was circulated to the Members of the World Trade
Organization (the "WTO") on 20 August 2001.
Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002) at 1.4 [hereinafter ETI Appellate report];
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33
I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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tax relief contingent on exports, contrary to WTO rules. 66 The WTO
Panel established to review the matter agreed with the European
Communities as did the Appellate Body on appeal. These reports were
adopted by the DSB on January 29, 2002.67
In fact, the United States knew the ETI scheme would be challenged
by the European Communities before it was adopted. An agreement
between the United States and the E.C. was in place that specifically
spelled out the procedures that would be followed to challenge the ETI
once the FSC repeal bill had been enacted, and prevented the European
Communities from instituting sanctions until the challenge was resolved.68
The agreement provided that the European Communities would challenge
the FSC replacement and argue that it was not WTO-compliant. Stuart
Eizenstat, U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary, said the agreement was only
a "procedural technicality. . .to protect their procedural rights" and "does
not signal the start of any trade war. ' 69 President Clinton stated that he
believed that the WTO would find the new regime compliant.7 °
Trade officials for the European Communities were just as adamant
that the new scheme not pass muster. One stated: "we believe the new
legislation is just as bad as its predecessor.",7 1 The FSC repeal bill was
finally enacted on November 14, 2000, during a lame duck session of
Congress after the November elections.
One reason that the new scheme is stated to be as "bad" as the old one
is because it is estimated that exporters will be able to obtain precisely
the same net reduction in tax under the new rules as they did under the
old system. 72 The European Communities stated the new rules arithmetically
correspond to the exempt foreign trade income of the FSC.73
66. Frances Williams, InternationalEconomy: WTO to Assess Sanctions U.S. Tax
Breaks European Union's Pounds 2.8bn Claim Over Exports, FIN. TIMES (London)

International Economy, Nov. 29, 2000 at 19.
Arbitrator Decision, supra note 2, at para. 1.2.
U.S. -E. U. Agreement on Extension of FSC Deadline, 2000 WORLDWIDE TAX
DAILY 194-20 (2000).
69. Robert Goulder et al., U.S. PresidentSigns FSC Repeal Bill; European Union
Seeks Trade Sanctions, TAX NOTES INT'L, Nov. 27, 2000, at 2541.
67.
68.

70.

Id.

71. Id.
72. See David Benson et al., New Law Repeals FSC, Implements New U.S. Tax
Scheme for ExtraterritorialIncome, TAX NOTES INT'L, Nov. 27, 2000, at 2457.
73. First Written Submission of the European Communities, United States - Tax
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, at para. 19, WT/DS108/RW Annex A-], (Jan. 17, 2001)
[hereinafter EC Submission].

In fact, the new rules actually expand the tax benefits to more entities
than were previously eligible. In enacting the new legislation, the U.S.
Congress extended its economic benefits to S corporations, individuals,
and partnerships that previously did not qualify for FSC benefits, and it
broadened the range of products that qualify for a tax subsidy by reducing
U.S. origin requirements. Foreign corporations can also claim the ETI
benefit. These additional benefits make the new ETI system more expensive
than the old FSC system. The U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
that the new legislation would provide
$4.5 billion in tax savings to
74
taxpayers between 2001 and 2010.
A significant complicating factor in drafting the FSC replacement was the
insistence on the part of the large multinational beneficiaries of the FSC that the
distribution of the replacement subsidy mirror that of the FSC subsidy, to the
penny, lest their shoe prices suffer. So the new regime had to look a whole lot
like the old regime.

The ETI was one of the most heavily lobbied issues on Capitol Hill
during the period immediately preceding the legislation's passage in
November of 2000. In addition to lobbying activities conducted individually,
large U.S. corporations worked in groups. In 2000, FSC extension was
the number one tax issue for the Business Round Table, a lobbying
group with an annual budget in excess of $30 million.76 The Business
Round Table declared: "It is important that any replacement in fact
replicates the results of the current regime and does not create winners
and losers among the current beneficiaries. 77
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and the National Foreign Trade
Council formed the FSC/ETI Coalition and got exporters to collectively
contribute $1 million for 2000 alone. Leading the PwC lobbying effort
was Ken Kies, former chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
and Barbara Angus, 78
who currently heads the Treasury Department's
international tax staff.
Most of the FSC benefits are received by a small number of large
corporations that account for most U.S. exports. 79 The top 50 companies
74. See Joint Committee on Taxation, 106th Cong., General Explanation of Tax
Legislation Enacted in the 106th Congress, 113 JCS-2-01 (Apr. 2001).
75. Lee A. Sheppard, Eye-Poking Over the FSC Replacement, TAX NOTES INT'L,
Mar. 12, 2001, at 1216-17(2001).
76. Martin A. Sullivan, 20 Talking Points on U.S. Export Tax Incentives, TAX
NOTES, Apr. 29, 2002, at 660.
77. Business Roundtable, Key Economic Policy Initiatives - An Agenda for Early
Action, (Jul. 21, 2000) available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/publications/
publication.aspx?qs=2426BF807822BOFI AD4
78. Sullivan, supra note 76.
79. Jose Oyola, Foreign Sales Corporation Beneficiaries: A Profile, TAX NOTES,
Aug. 14, 2000, at 936 n.4 (estimating that "U.S. firms with more than 500 employees
accounted for only three percent of all US exporters in 1997, but the exports of these
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received 86.8 percent of the total benefits. 80 The Boeing Company alone
accounted for over 10 percent of the total FSC benefits from 1991 to
1998, representing 10 percent of Boeing's income for that period.81
General Electric Company, Motorola, Inc., Caterpillar Inc., Allied Signal
Inc., and Cisco Systems, Inc. individually received more than five
percent of the total benefits during this same period.82 Such percentages
make it no wonder that a heavy lobbying push was made to retain these
tax breaks.83
XI. THE ETI ACT IN DETAIL
In response to the WTO findings and a threat of EU trade sanctions,
the U.S. Congress passed the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000. The legislation repealed the FSC provisions and
created similar provisions elsewhere in the code. The FSC Repeal Act
offers some administrative simplification by removing both the
requirements for a subsidiary and the highly technical compliance rules
of the FSC.84
The ETI Act consists of changes to five sections of the U.S. tax
code.85 The overall effect of the rules is to reduce the tax on profits from
firms represented almost 70 percent of all U.S. exports.").
80. Id at 934.
81. Id.at 936.
82. Id.
83. What exactly is meant by "rent" and "seeking"? "Seeking" is more than
wanting, because it involves expending resources to obtain the favor of
government..."[Rients" simply refer to excess returns to private parties due to
special privileges or protections accorded them by government (whether they
be the first Queen Elizabeth's monopolies or present day tariffs and import
quotas). The "excess" is the additional profit above and beyond the profit that
would be enjoyed in the absence of favorable government action. In the
context of international economic policy, rents are therefore simply the
additional profit above and beyond what could be made by companies with
intervention on their side. Some of these rents flow through to stockholders,
workers, and in some countries to the politicians who provide the favorable
treatment. In actual practice, rent seeking operates partly through the electoral
process and partly through interest group influence on legislative and
administrative processes.
KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME 6-7 (200 1).

84. William M Funk, The Thirty-Years Tax War, TAX NOTES INT'L, Oct. 1, 2001,
at 65, 71.
85. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 16. Certain parts of Sections 2
and 5 relate to foreign sales corporations and part of Section 3, entitled "Treatment of
Extraterritorial Income," amends the United States Internal Revenue Code by inserting
into it a new Section 114, as well as a new Subpart E, which is in turn composed of new

exports by about 15 percent. A 35 percent effective tax rate would be
reduced to about 30 percent. For example, if an exporter generated $1 of
export income on sales of $10, 86its tax bill would be reduced from $0.35
to $0.30 under the ETI regime.
The ETI provisions apply to foreign corporations which elect to be
treated, for tax purposes, as U.S. corporations 87 as well as any other U.S.
taxpayer. The ETI measure permits all these taxpayers to elect on a
transaction-by-transaction basis to have qualifying income taxed in
accordance with the provisions of the ETI Act.
With the new regime based on transactions and not on separate entities, FSCs
can be discarded and trade can be carried out directly by the parent or other
manufacturing entity. This may not necessarily end the need for a separate
subsidiary to utilize other benefits. With the continuing importance of meeting
mathematical tests, administrative and accounting convenierg may still favor
having export operations in a specially established subsidiary.

The FSC Repeal Act states that "extraterritorial income" is exempt
from U.S. taxation and it partially converts the U.S. tax code from a
worldwide system to a territorial one. However, the legislation defines
extraterritorial income as gross income attributable to foreign trading
gross receipts ("FTGR") and defines FTGR in essentially the same
manner as it was defined under the FSC system. "All income that is not
attributable to FTGR is taxed on the same basis as prior to passage of the
FSC Repeal Act." 89

The complex set of transfer pricing rules previously in place were
eliminated along with the foreign subsidiary requirement. "However,
Sections 941, 942 and 943.
86. See Sullivan, supra note 76, at 661.
87. I.R.C. § 943(e)(3).
88. Funk, supra note 84, at 71.
89. Taxpayers who have income attributable to FTGR can save tax. The reduction
is equal to either 1.2 percent of FTGR, 15 percent of qualifying foreign trade
income or 30 percent of foreign sale and leasing income. Although,
superficially, the calculations for determining exempt income seem different
from the FSC regime, the numbers work out to be exactly the same: the new
percentages (1.2 percent and 15 percent) are equal to the old administrative
pricing percentages (1.83 percent and 23 percent) multiplied by 15/23rds and
the 30 percent FSLI exclusion corresponds to the exclusion when section 482
arm's-length pricing rules were utilized. For the foreign direct costs tests,
foreign direct costs must meet either the 50 percent or the 85 percent test:
either foreign direct costs must be equivalent to or greater than 50 percent of
total direct costs attributable to the transaction[s], or foreign direct costs must
be equivalent to or greater than 85 percent of total direct costs in two of five
types of enumerated activities. The activities are the following: advertising
and sales promotion, processing of customer orders and arranging for delivery,
transportation outside the United States, determination and transmittal of a
final invoice, and assumption of credit risks.
Id.
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the calculations for determining exempt income have been adjusted in
such a way that ensures that substantially the same benefits are provided
to exporters." 90 The income from foreign trade under the FSC Repeal
Act that is exempt is "qualifying foreign trade income" ("QFTr").
QFTI is an amount, which, if excluded from the taxpayer's gross
income, will result in a reduction of the taxable income of the taxpayer
from the qualifying transaction. 9 1 QFTI is calculated as the greater of
(1) 1.2 percent of FTGR, (2) 15 percent of FTI (defined as taxable
income attributable to FTGR, as previously defined under FSC law), or
(3) 30 percent of "foreign sale and leasing income" ("FSLI"), a new
90. Id. at 72.
91. Section 2 of the ETI Act repeals the foreign sales corporation rules by
repealing I.R.C. sections 921-27 entirely. Section 3 of the ETI Act inserted sections 114,
941, 942 and 943 into the I.R.C., and created new rules under which certain income is
excluded from United States taxation.
Section 114(a) provides a specific exclusion from gross income by stating that gross
income "does not include extraterritorial income." Section 114(b) excludes from 114(a)
"extraterritorial income which is not qualifying foreign trade income as determined
under subpart E of part III of subchapter N." Therefore, in order for income to be
excluded under these rules it must be QFTI. § 941(a) defines QFTI as follows:
Qualifying Foreign Trade Income.- For purposes of this subpart and section
114:
(1)In general.- The term 'qualifying foreign trade income' means, with
respect to any transaction, the amount of gross income which, IF
EXCLUDED (emphasis added), will result in a reduction of the taxable
income of the taxpayer from such transaction equal to the greatest of(A) 30 percent of the foreign sale and leasing income (defined in §
941(c)(1)) derived by the taxpayer from such transaction,
(B) 1.2 percent of the foreign trading gross receipts (defined in § 942(a))
derived by the taxpayer from the transaction, or
(C) 15 percent of the foreign trade income (defined in § 941(b)) derived
by the taxpayer from the transaction.
Section 941 is the first step in defining QFTI. The WTO found Section 941 to be a
permissive section of the code, not mandatory. Use of the words "if excluded" allows a
taxpayer who otherwise qualifies to be treated under the act to instead use a foreign tax
credit if it would result in a lower overall tax.
Section 5(b) prohibits foreign corporations from electing to be treated as FSCs after 30
September 2000 and provides for the termination of inactive FSCs. Section 5(c) also
creates a "transition period" for certain transactions of existing FSCs. Specifically,
under section 5(c)(1) of the ETI Act, the repeal of the provisions of the I.R.C. relating to
FSCs "shall not apply" to transactions of existing FSCs which occur before 1 January
2002 or to any other transactions of such FSCs which occur after 31 December 2001,
pursuant to a binding contract between the FSC and an unrelated person which is in
effect on 30 September 2000. These provisions are the subject of the European
Communities' claim that the United States has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies, in
accordance with Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. ETI Appellate Report, supra note
65, at para. 17.

term. FSLI is FTI that is allocable to foreign economic processes or
which is derived from lease or rental of "qualifying foreign trade
property" ("QFTP") outside the United States.92
Generally, income from specific transactions will qualify for treatment

in accordance with the provisions of the ETI measure if it is income
attributable to gross receipts: (i) from specific types of transaction; 93 (ii)
involving QFTP; 94 and (iii) if the "foreign economic
95 process requirement"
is fulfilled with respect to each such transaction.

92. Even the new FSLI replicates the old regime. FSLI is limited to property
manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted by the taxpayer, or acquired by
the taxpayer for arm's-length prices as determined according to section 482
transfer pricing rules. Just as it was under the old regime, 30 percent of profits
from transactions in export property are exempt where pricing is determined
by reference to section 482 rules.
ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para: 17.
93. Turning to the first of these conditions, the rules contained in the ETI measure
apply, in particular, to income arising from sale, lease or rental transactions. The ETI
measure also applies to income earned from the performance of services "related or
subsidiary to" qualifying sales or lease transactions, as well as to income earned from the
performance of certain other services. I.R.C. § 942(a)(3).
94. The second condition is that these transactions involve QFrP. Section 943(a)(1)
defines QFTP as property:
(A) manufactured, produced, grown or extracted within or outside the United
States, (B) held primarily for sale, lease or rental, in the ordinary course of
business, for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States,
and (C) not more than 50 percent of the fair market value of which is
attributable to (i) articles manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted outside
the United States, and (ii) direct costs for labor performed outside the United
States.
I.R.C. §§ 943(a)(3) and (4) set forth specific exclusions from this general definition.
95. This requirement is fulfilled "if the taxpayer (or any person acting under
contract with such taxpayer) has participated outside the United States in the solicitation
(other than advertising), the negotiation, or the making of the contract relating to such
transaction." Id. § 942(b). Under the ETI Act, the need to satisfy these three conditions
is subject to a number of exceptions.
The detailed rules of the ETI measure provide that foreign trading gross receipts may
be earned through (i) any sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade
property; (ii) any lease or rental of qualifying foreign trade property; (iii) any services
which are related and subsidiary to (i) and (ii); (iv) for engineering or architectural
services for construction projects located (or proposed for location) outside the United
States; and (v) for the performance of managerial services for a person other than a
related person in furtherance of activities under (i), (ii) or (iii). Id. § 942(a)(3).
A certain portion of the "direct costs" of the transaction must be attributable to
activities performed outside the United States The relevant activities are: (A) advertising
and sales promotion; (B) the processing of customer orders and the arranging for
delivery; (C) transportation outside the United States in connection with delivery to the
customer; (D) the determination and transmittal of final invoice or statement of account
or the receipt of payment, and (E) the assumption of credit risk. A taxpayer will be
treated as having satisfied the foreign economic process requirement when at least 50
percent of the total costs attributable to such activities is attributable to activities
performed outside the United States, or, for at least two of these five categories of
activity, when at least 85 percent of the total costs attributable to such category of activity
is attributable to activities performed outside the United States. 5§ 942(b)(2)(A)(ii),
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In general, U.S. exporters will be able to obtain the same net reduction
in U.S. tax under the ETI Act as under the previous FSC scheme.96
XII. DETAILED FINDINGS OF THE APPELLATE PANEL
The first issue addressed by the appellate panel in its decision released
on January 14, 2002, 97 regarding the report of the original panel decision
of August 20, 2001,98 is as follows:

(b)(2)(B) and (b)(3).
Section 942(a) designates as "foreign trading gross receipts" the receipts generated in
transactions satisfying all three of these conditions. Under Section 114(e), "extraterritorial
income" is the gross income attributable to foreign trading gross receipts and, under
Section 941(b) "foreign trade income" is the taxable income attributable to foreign
trading gross receipts.
96. The following examples show that the same net reduction in U.S. tax is
obtained from either the ETI or FSC schemes. Benson, supra note 72.
Example 1
X, a U.S. corporation, has foreign trading gross receipts (FTGR) of $10 million
that generate combined taxable income (CTI) for FSC purposes of $1 million
after the allocation of the cost of goods sold and expenses. Under the FSC
administrative pricing rules, X would be entitled to pay a tax deductible FSC
commission of $230,000 that is equal to the higher of 1.83 percent of FTGR
($183,000) or 23 percent of CTI. The FSC will be tax exempt on 15/23rds, or
$150,000, of its commission income, resulting in a net U.S. tax benefit to X
(which obtains a dividends-received deduction for FSC dividends) of $52,500
($150,000 x 35 percent). Under the act, X will be able to exclude $150,000 as
qualifying foreign trade taxable income, based on the higher of 1.2 percent of
FTGR ($120,000) or 15 percent of foreign trade income. The exclusion will
result in a net tax benefit to X of $52,500.
Example 2
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that the CTI is $500,000. In this
case, X would use the 1.83 percent method to claim the maximum FSC
commission deduction of $183,000 (versus 23 percent of CTI or $115,000). This
would result in a net federal tax benefit to X of $ 41,772 ($183,000 x 15/23rds x
35 percent). Under the act, X could exclude $120,000 as QFTI, which results in
a net federal tax benefit of $42,000.
Example 3
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that the CTI is $300,000. X would
initially use the 1.83 percent method to claim the maximum FSC deduction of
$183,000, but the FSC commission would be limited to $138,000 (CTI x 46
percent), resulting in a net federal tax benefit to X of $31,500. Under the act, X
could initially exclude $120,000, but X could exclude only $90,000 (30 percent
x $300,000), which results in a net tax benefit of $31,500.
97. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65.
98. Report of the Panel, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DSl08/RW (Jan. 17, 2001), in 34 WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, Bernan's
Annotated Reporter (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter ETI Panel Report].

[W]hether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.30 and 8.43 of the Panel
Report, that the ETI measure.. .involves the foregoing of revenue which is
"otherwise due" and thus gives rise to a "financial contribution" within the
99
1 (a)(l)(ii) of the SCM Agreement;
meaning of Article 1.

The Panel found that the ETI measure "results in the foregoing of
revenue which is 'otherwise due' and thus gives rise to a financial
contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM
Agreement." 100
Article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement sets out to define "subsidy"
and deems it to exist when: "government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)... and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred." Although Article 1 defines a subsidy,
it does not impose any obligations regarding the subsidies defined. It
does however create an initial threshold inquiry that must be satisfied.
"[T]he granting of a subsidy is not, in and of itself, prohibited under the
SCM Agreement. Nor does granting a "subsidy," without more, constitute
an inconsistency with that Agreement. The universe of subsidies
is vast.
°
Not all subsidies are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement."''
In its appeal of the dispute settlement panel's ruling, the United States
essentially repeated the arguments it had made in the original case, and
argued that the FSC replacement actually did make a territorial
exception to the general rule of taxing worldwide income. The United
States contended the Panel ignored the fact that the definition of "gross
income" is not contained in Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC") alone, but depends also on other
sections of the IRC and, more
02
particularly, on sections 1 14(a) and (b).1
Second, the U.S. argued that the Panel erroneously created a distinction
between a "specific" and a "general" tax exclusion. The Panel stated that a
Member may exclude a category of income from taxation only if it excludes "all
of the income" in that category. The United States contends that such an
analysis improperly incorporates the concept of specificity, found in Article 2 of
the SCM Agreement, into the definition of "subsidy" in Article 1. Third, the
Panel created another erroneous standard by stating that a tax exclusion must
have "some kind of overall rationale and coherence" if it is to avoid foregoing
revenue that is otherwise due. Such a proposition is inconsistent with the
Appellate Body's prior statement that a Member is free to tax or not tax the
categories of revenues that it chooses. Fourth, the United States appeals what it
considers to be a failure by the Panel to apply the original panel's "but for" test,
a test which the Appellate Body had upheld. The United States submits that
"but for" the exclusion of qualifying foreign trade income, all extraterritorial
99.
100.
101.
102.

ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 80(a).
Id. at para. 8.43 (footnote omitted).
Id. at para. 47.
Id. at para. 27.
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income would be excluded from "gross income". Finally, the Panel erred in
finding that extraterritorial income excluded by the ETI Act necessarily would
be taxed if the ETI Act did not exist. The United States submits that merely
classifying income as "gross income" does not per se mean that it would
necessarily be taxed, since "gross income" may also be subject to deferral,
deductions or foreign tax credits. 103

New code section 114(a) states: "gross income does not include
extraterritorial income." Technically, the new general rule applies to a
much broader range of foreign income than the FSC regime exempted.
The United States argued that this new broad general rule does not
require that the taxpayer export, or that the goods it sells be domestically
produced, or that it have a special foreign sales subsidiary, or that it be a
U.S. citizen, so long as it is subject to U.S. tax jurisdiction. All of these
contentions are true, except that the rest of the FSC replacement
provisions remove almost all of the exemption. New code section
114(b) states that extraterritorial income does not include income that is
not "qualified foreign trade income." The FSC replacement's success
depends on the definition of this term.'04
The European Communities argued that the FSC replacement is a
subsidy according to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. Article 1.1 of the
SCM Agreement states that a subsidy is deemed to exist if there is a
"financial contribution" by a government, and "a benefit is thereby
conferred." Article 1.1 (a)(2)(ii) states that a "financial contribution" includes
"government revenue that is otherwise due [that] is forgone or not
collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits)."
The United States argued that the FSC replacement does not cause the
government to forgo revenue otherwise due within the meaning of
Article 1 of the SCM agreement because the FSC replacement's general
extraterritorial income exclusion, section 114(a), constitutes a new normative
benchmark, or prevailing standard, against which exclusions are to be
judged and "does not create a tax-saving exception to an otherwise
applicable revenue-raising general rule."'0 5 Thus, the United States argued,
the ETI is not a subsidy. Revenue that was never due cannot be forgone.
According to the European Communities, the Panel's conclusion was
not based on the idea that Section 61 of the IRC was the normative
benchmark, nor that any exception to it would be a subsidy. Rather, in
analyzing the ETI Act, the Panel looked at the "overall situation as an
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See Sheppard, supra note 75, at 1217.
EC Submission, supranote 73 Annex A-2 at para. 2, 61.

integrated whole." 106
There is no specific WTO provision that states what a country's "tax
system has to look like in the first place."' 7 WTO members are free to
tax or "not to tax certain types of income" as they choose. 0 8 "[ln principle,
a Member is free not to tax any particular category of income it wishes,
even if this results in the grant of a 'subsidy' under Article 1.1 of the
SCM Agreement, provided that the Member respects its WTO obligations
with respect to the subsidy."' 0 9
"That is what the United States insists it is doing with the FSC
replacement, which it argues 'does not constitute a subsidy because tax
on the excluded income is not 'otherwise due." 110 This brings U.S. tax
provisions into compliance with the WTO's principles.
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement states that there is a
"financial contribution by a government" where "government revenue
that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected." This was addressed
in the WTO panel's report where it said:
...

the "foregoing" of revenue "otherwise due" implies that less revenue has

been raised by the government than would have been raised in a different
situation, or, that is, "otherwise". Moreover, the word "foregone" suggests that
the government has given up an entitlement to raise revenue that it could
"otherwise" have raised. This cannot, however, be an entitlement in
the
abstract, because governments, in theory, could tax all revenues. There must,
therefore, be some defined, normative benchmark against which a comparison
can be made between the revenue actually raised and the revenue that would
have been raised "otherwise". We, therefore, agree with the Panel that the term
"otherwise due" implies some kind of comparison between the revenues
due
under the contested measure and revenues that would be due in some other
situation. We also agree with the Panel that the basis of comparison must be the
tax rules applied by the Member in question. . . . What is "otherwise due",
therefore, depends on the rules of taxation that each Member, by its own choice,
establishes for itself.11

From a fiscal perspective, when a government chooses not to tax
certain income, no revenue is "due" on that income. "However, although a
government might, in a sense, be said to "forego" revenue in this
situation, this alone gives no indication as to whether the revenue
foregone was "otherwise due." "In other words, the mere fact that revenues
106. ETI Panel Report, supra note 98, at para. 8.23.
107. See Sheppard, supra note 75, at 1218.
108. Id.
109. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 86. "[Tlhe granting of a subsidy
is not, in and of itself, prohibited under the SCM Agreement. Nor does granting a
"subsidy", without more, constitute an inconsistency with that Agreement. The universe
of subsidies is vast. Not all subsidies are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement." Id. at
para. 85.
110. See Sheppard, supra note 75, at 1218.
111. FSC Appellate Report, supra note 11, at para. 90.
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are not 'due' from a fiscal perspective does not determine that the revenues
are or are not 'otherwise'' due'
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
12
of the SCM Agreement.
The question essentially becomes defining what the normative
benchmark is in order to distinguish between situations where revenue
foregone is "otherwise
due" and situations where revenue foregone is not
"otherwise due."' 13 The United States made a circular argument when
attempting to win this point regarding what the normative benchmark
should be. The United States argued that the panel misconstrued the
concept of "gross income" and ignored other relevant provisions of the
U.S. tax code. 14 "According to the United States, under the IRC, 'gross
income' is the starting point for calculating taxable income, but 'gross
income' by itself is not necessarily subject to tax because a taxpayer can
make 'deductions' from it.""' 5 The United States went on to say that the
Panel "erred in determining that the prevailing rule of taxation in the
United States is that 'gross income' is taxable." 6
"Whether revenue has been forgone requires a comparison of the
whole U.S. [tax] system before the FSC replacement with the U.S. [tax]
system [under the ETI scheme]."' " 7 The European Communities argued
that the WTO should compare like with like-the U.S. treatment of
export sales of goods with the U.S. treatment of domestic sales of goods.
The WTO determined that due to the complexity and variances between18
tax codes, a "rational basis" was required to make the comparison."
Further, the WTO determined that it was virtually impossible to
conclusively distinguish between those portions of a tax code that fall
within a "general rule" and those that are part of the "exceptions" to it.' 19
It also stated that under Article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement there
is no revuirement to determine what the general rule of taxation is
anyway.
The answer was to treat like income similarly to like income.' 2' The

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 88.
Id. at para. 89.
Id. at para. 84.
Id.
Id.
See Sheppard, supra note 75, at 1218.
ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 90.
Id. at para. 91.
Id.
Id. at para. 91.

fiscal treatment of comparable income of taxpayers in comparable
situations should be the same.122 Due to the difficulty in defining like
income, the appellate panel attempted to create a definition using
examples of what would be inappropriate to consider "like income"
including:
" Income earned in sales transactions compared to income
earned from employment and
* Taxation of foreign-sourced income in the hands of a
domestic corporation compared with the taxation of
foreign-sourced income in the hands of a foreign
corporation. 123

To identify the normative benchmark for comparison, the appellate
panel looked to the United States' other rules of taxation applicable to
the foreign-source income of United States citizens and residents earned
through the sale or24 lease of property, or through the performance of
"related" services.
It did so to determine whether, and to what extent,
the U.S. imposes tax on foreign-source income of U.S. citizens and
residents, including the income covered by the measure at issue, which
the United States considers to be foreign-source income.
In other words, our inquiry under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) is not simply
ended at this stage of analysis because the measure involves an
allocation of income between domestic- and foreign-source income.
Rather, we must compare the way the United States taxes the portion of
the income covered by the measure, which it treats as foreign-source,
with the way it taxes other foreign-source income under its own rules of
taxation. 125
In the panel's "view, the normative benchmark for determining
whether the ETI measure" results in the foregoing of income otherwise
126
due is based on the definition of taxable income in the U.S. tax code.
Under the tax code, taxable income means "gross income minus the
122.

Id. at para. 98.

123. Id. at paras. 90, 92.
124. The panel added for clarification:
We recall that the measure applies to certain foreign corporations that elect to
be treated as United States corporations. For the purpose of United States
taxation, these corporations are deemed to be United States corporations. Thus

we do not examine the United States' fiscal treatment of the foreign-source
income of foreign corporations including foreign subsidiaries of United States

corporations - that do not elect to be treated as United States corporations.
We do not, therefore, examine the rules of taxation for the foreign-source
income of foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations.
Id. atn. 75.
125. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 98.
126. Id. atpara. 101.
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deductions allowed" under the IRC.127 Gross income means "all income
from whatever source derived."'' 28 Thus, these sections do not distinguish
between income based on whether the income is treated by the United
States as domestic- or foreign-source. 29 "Rather, these provisions treat
'all income from whatever source' in identical fashion so that, in principle,
foreign-source gross income of United States citizens and 13residents,
less
0
allowable deductions, is subject to tax as taxable income."'
The other provisions of the U.S. tax code found by the panel to be part
of the norm for comparison purposes were the provisions to provide tax
credits against foreign taxes paid by U.S. taxpayers. Where a U.S.
taxpayer pays tax in a foreign jurisdiction, he is normally allowed a
credit up to the amount that would have been due to the United States,13'
The comparison to be made is between taxation of foreign-sourced
income under the normative rules outlined above
132 with taxation of QFTI,
which is also treated as foreign-source income.
The panel found a significant
contrast between the rules applicable to
' 33
QFTI and the "other rules."'

United States citizens and residents can elect, at their own discretion: either to
have certain of their income treated as extraterritorial income under the
ETI measure, with the result that a portion will be definitively excluded from

taxation as QFTI; or these same taxpayers can elect to have the same income
taxed under the "other" rules applicable to foreign-source income, with tax
credits being recognized for, at least, a portion of foreign taxes paid. Where
the taxpayer elects not to be taxed under the ETI measure, the United States
taxes this income under the "other" rules of taxation applicable to foreignsource income. We see this as confirmation that, absent the ETI measure, the
United States would tax the income under
the "otherwise" applicable rules of
134
taxation we have used as our benchmark.

The U.S. tax code allows a taxpayer to choose whether to be taxed
under the ETI rules. The only reason for a taxpayer to choose ETI is if a
lower overall tax bill results.1 35 As such, the amount of tax paid will
127. I.R.C. §63(a).
128. Id. §61(a).
129. Id. §§ 861-65 (providing the rules to determine whether income of United
States citizens and residents is from sources within or outside the United States).
130. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 99.
131. Id. at para. 100.
132. Id. atpara. 101.
133. Id. atpara. 102.
134. Id. atpara. 103.
135. We mentioned earlier that, where a taxpayer elects to use the ETI measure,
it must give up any tax credits it has obtained through taxation in a foreign

likely be less than the tax which the taxpayer would have paid, on that
income, under the rules "otherwise" applicable to foreign-source income, if
the taxpayer did not elect to use the ETI measure.
This, too, confirms that the United States will forego revenue under the ETI
measure that would be "otherwise due". In our view, the definitive exclusion
from tax of QFTI, compared with the taxation of other foreign-source income,
and coupled with the right of election for taxpayers to use the rules of taxation
most favourable to them, means that, under the contested 36measure, the
United States foregoes revenue on QFTI which is otherwise due.1

The European Communities offered as further proof "the congressional
revenue estimates attached to the FSC replacement show that revenue
has been forgone."' 37 The final nail in the United States' coffin was
provided by Manal Corwin, the U.S. Treasury Department's acting
international tax council in a speech three weeks after the FSC Repeal
bill was passed. Ms. Corwin called the new statute a "narrow exception"
from the traditional U.S. tax model based on reaching the worldwide
income of each U.S. taxpayer, regardless of where such income is
derived.138 The panel listened to her and agreed.
XIII. IS THE SUBSIDY EXPORT-CONTINGENT?
The EC called the FSC replacement an illegal export subsidy under
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement because qualification is contingent
upon export performance. 39 The panel found that "the FSC Replacement
State that is attributable to the income excluded from taxation. Accordingly,
the measure will be beneficial to taxpayers where the amount of tax otherwise
due on excluded QFTI is greater than the amount of tax credits which the
taxpayer must give up in relation to the excluded QFTI. For instance, this
calculus is likely to result in taxpayers electing to use the measure where: (a)
the amount of income actually taxed in a foreign jurisdiction is less than the
amount of excluded QFTI and (b) where the rate of taxation applied to income
taxed in a foreign jurisdiction is lower than the United States rate of taxation
that would "otherwise" be applied to the excluded QFTI.
Id. at para. 104 n.80.
136. Id. atparas. 104-05.
137. See Sheppard, supra note 75, at 1218.
138. Robert Goulder, U.S. Treasury Official Denies FSC Repeal Signals Move to
Territoriality,TAX NOTES INT'L, Dec. 18, 2000, at 2749.
139. In Appellate Body Report Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft ("Canada - Aircraft"), at paras. 162-80, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999), it was stated:
[A] subsidy is contingent "in law" upon export performance when the existence of
that condition can be demonstrated on the basis of the very words of the
relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument constituting the
measure.... [F]or a subsidy to be de jure export contingent, the underlying
legal instrument does not always have to provide expressis verbis that the
subsidy is available only upon fulfillment of the condition of export performance.
Such conditionality can also be derived by necessary implication from the
words actually used in the measure.
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Act provides subsidies which are contingent upon export performance
contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement l14 and specifically related
to export contrary to item (e) of Annex 1 of the SCM Agreement."'' 4 1
Export linkage is defined by Article 3. 1(a), which prohibits "subsidies
contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other
conditions, upon export performance..." unless the Agreement on
Agriculture holds to the contrary. Footnote 4 to this provision states that
"in fact" means that the subsidy, though not legally tied to export
performance, is illegal if it is in fact tied to anticipated export activity or
export earnings. 142 This does not prohibit all export subsidies.
The European Communities drew a distinction between two different
subsidies alleged to be granted under the ETI measure. The first related
to property produced "within the United States"; the second to property
produced "outside the United States". The European Communities argued
43
that both these subsidies are de jure contingent upon export performance. 1
In relation to U.S. produced goods, the panel stated:
[T]he words of the statute itself make it clear that exporting is a necessary
precondition to qualify for the subsidy. In respect of US-produced goods, the
existence and amount of the subsidy depends upon the existence of income
arising from the exportation of such goods. In relation to US-produced goods,
the existence of such income is clearly conditional, or dependent upon, the
exportation of such goods from the United States. We are therefore of the view
that by necessary implication the scheme is de jure dependent or contingent
upon export in relation to US-produced goods. 144

140. Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, supra note 6, states:
[S]ubsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several
other conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in
Annex I" are prohibited. Footnote 4 of article 3.1 (a) explains: "This standard
is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without
having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied
to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.
141. Annex I paragraph (e) of the SCM Agreement includes in its list of export
subsidies "The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to
exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or
commercial enterprises." It then defines direct taxes in the footnote 58 of the Annex as:
"wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the
ownership of real property." Id.
142. SCM Agreement, supra note 6, at n.4.
143. E.C. Submission, supra note 73, at paras. 62-66. The European Communities
also argued, in the alternative, that both the basic and the extended subsidies provided
under the ETI Act are defacto export contingent. Id. at paras. 131-45.
144. ETI Panel Report, supra note 98, at para. 8.60 (emphasis added).

The United States claimed "that the ETI measure is export-neutral"
since "the tax exclusion is available with respect to property that is not
produced in the United States and, therefore, not exported from the
United States."'' 45 Therefore, since "the tax exclusion can be obtained
without exportation... export performance is146not a condition that must
be satisfied in order to obtain this exclusion."'
Under the ETI scheme, the United States excludes from tax a portion
of the income earned by U.S. citizens and residents through certain
transactions involving, or related to, QFTP. Section 943(a)(1)(A) of the
IRC defines QFTP as property "manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
within or outside the United States." The appellate panel concluded that
this "contemplates two different factual situations, one involving
property produced within the [United States] and the other involving
property produced outside the [United States,]"' 147 each with its own tax
provisions. 148 For property produced within the United States, the taxpayer
can obtain the subsidy only by satisfying the conditions in the code
relating to this property. In order to obtain the subsidy, the property
must be "held primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in the ordinary course
of trade or business for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside
the United States. . .. ,49 The Appellate Panel concluded that "[flor property
produced within the United States.... the property must be exported [in
order to obtain the subsidy]."' 150 "In other words, use outside the United
States necessarily implies exportation of the property from the United
States (the place of production) to the place of use."' '5 This is an
"export contingency, under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.' 152
The fact that there is also a subsidy for products created outside of the
United States does not stop the ones manufactured within the United
States from being export contingent. 153
XIV. THE FOOTNOTE 59 VIOLATION; DOUBLE TAXATION OF
FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME

"'Double taxation' occurs when the same income, in the hands of the
145.
146.
147.

ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 110.
Id.
Id. at para. 113.

148.

I.R.C. § 943(a)(2) contains rules that apply only to property produced "outside

the United States," while I.R.C. § 943(c) has source rules that address only the case of
property produced "within the United States."
149. I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
150. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 116.
151.

Id.

152.

Id. at para. 118.

153.

Id.

[VOL. 5: 503, 2004]

Fishingfor Rainbows
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.

same taxpayer, is liable to tax in different States."' 54 "The United States
also argues that the FSC replacement is a permissible measure to prevent
double taxation of foreign source income according to footnote 59 of
paragraph (e) of Annex I of the SCM Agreement,1 55 because non-taxation
of foreign-source income is an established, accepted means of avoiding
double taxation." 156 Annex 1 to the SCM Agreement provides an
illustrative list of prohibited subsidies. Item (e) listed in Annex 1 states
that "[t]he full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically
related to exports, or direct taxes..." is a prohibited export subsidy.
The Appellate Panel set out to first determine whether the ETI Act is a
measure to avoid double taxation within the meaning of footnote 59 and,
if so found, then would determine whether footnote 59 creates an
exception to the prohibition against export subsidies in accordance with
footnote 5.
157 Because the Panel concluded that the ETI Act is not a
measure to avoid double taxation under footnote 59, it did not reach the
question of whether footnote 59 creates an exception under footnote 5.
The Appellate Panel examined the ETI Act's "design, structure and
architecture" to determine whether or not it was created to serve the
purpose of avoiding double taxation.1 58 The Panel did not say that
avoiding double taxation must be the sole or leading purpose underlying
a measure, however it did state that if one of the purposes of the
154. Id. atpara. 137.
155. Footnote 59 of para. (e) of Annex I of the SCM Agreement, supra note 6,
states:
The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy
where, for example, appropriate interest charges are collected. The Members
reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in transactions between exporting
enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should for
tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent
enterprises acting at arm's length. Any Member may draw the attention of
another Member to administrative or other practices which may contravene
this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct taxes in export
transactions. In such circumstances the Members shall normally attempt to
resolve their differences using the facilities of existing bilateral tax treaties or
other specific international mechanisms, without prejudice to the rights and
obligations of Members under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation
created in the preceding sentence. Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a
Member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source
income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member.
156. See Sheppard, supra note 75, at 1219.
157. Footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement, supra note 6, provides that measures
identified in Annex I of that agreement as not being export subsidies are not prohibited
under any part of the agreement.
158. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 149.

159
provision is to avoid double taxation it must be "reasonably discernable."'
The Act was found to be both unusually broad and unusually narrow
for a measure whose purpose is to avoid double taxation. 60 Further, the
Act was found to:

[overlap] with an extensive system of bilateral agreements designed to avoid
double taxation through foreign tax credits, and its application [was] not
designed to cover situations where such agreements did not exist .... No single
one of these elements, taken separately, was sufficient to lead the Panel to the
conclusion that the Act is not a measure taken to avoid the double taxation of
foreign-source income; taken together, however, they lead us to the conclusion
that the Act is not a measure taken to avoid thelouble taxation of foreignsource income within the meaning of footnote 59."

Finally, the Panel found that the Act was not designed to complement,
or even take into account, U.S. bilateral tax treaties and preexisting U.S.
tax credits that serve to avoid double taxation. The Panel did not preclude
the use of alternative mechanisms to avoid double taxation. It only said
that the Act was not properly structured within the present facts and in
the context of the U.S. tax system to achieve the stated goal.' 62
XV. VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE

The Panel found that:
the United States has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 10.1
of the Agreement on Agriculture by applying the export subsidies, with respect
to both scheduled and unscheduled agricultural products, in a manner that, at the
very least, threatens to circumvent its export
subsidy commitments under
63
Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.1

159. ETI Panel Report, supra note 98, at para. 7.17.
160. [T]he Act includes as "extraterritorial income" that is excluded from
taxation income which would, in our view, not necessarily be treated as taxable
in other jurisdictions. In this respect, the Act is unusually broad for a measure
whose purpose is to avoid double taxation. At the same time, the "extraterritorial
income" excluded from taxation does not include a range of income which is
potentially subject to taxation in other jurisdictions. It is thus, in certain respects,
unusually narrow for a measure whose asserted purpose is to avoid double
taxation. Finally, we note that the Act overlaps with an extensive system of
bilateral agreements to avoid double taxation through foreign tax credits, and
its application is not designed to cover situations where such agreements did
not exist. No single one of these elements, taken separately, would necessarily
lead us to the conclusion that the Act is not a measure taken to avoid the
double taxation of foreign-source income; taken together, however, they lead
us to the conclusion that the Act is not a measure taken to avoid the double
taxation of foreign-source income within the meaning of footnote 59.
Id. at para. 8.97.
161. Id. atpara. 7.17.
162. Id. at paras. 8.1-8.171, 9.1.
163. Id. at para. 8.122.
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The panel reached this decision by determining the same reasoning
used to find violations of the SCM Agreement applied in the instant
case. 164 It was "also applicable as regards whether the Act gives rise to
subsidies contingent upon export performance within the meaning of
Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture for the purposes of Article
10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture."' 65 The subsidies provided by the
FSC Replacement Act were found to be export subsidies within the
meaning of Articles 1(e) 166 with respect to qualifying property produced
within the United States and that the United States acted inconsistently
69
with Articles 8167, and 10.1168 of the Agreement on Agriculture.1
XVI. ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS
The panel found two additional violations upon which to report.
First, that the FSC Replacement Act provides treatment less favorable
to imported products than is accorded to like United States products,
contrary to Article 111:4 of GATT 1994,170 and second, that the FSC
Replacement Act contains transitional provisions which allow
companies to continue to benefit from the WTO incompatible FSC
scheme beyond the October 1, 2000, thus failing to withdraw the

164. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 188.
165. Id.
166. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, art. l(e) (defining "export subsidy as
"subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in
Article 9 of this agreement").
167. "Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in
conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that
Member's Schedule." Id. art. 8.
168. "Export subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 shall not be applied in a
manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy
commitments; nor shall non-commercial transactions be used to circumvent such
commitments." Id. art. 10.1.
169. ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, at para. 196.
170. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph
shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of
transport and not on the nationality of the product.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. III [hereinafter GATT].

subsidy and implement the DSB recommendations and rulings.' 7'
XVII. DETERMINATION OF THE LARGEST WTO PENALTY So FAR
The panel's only task left at this point was to
agree on the punishment
172
to be meted out by the arbitrators of the DSU.
The arbitrator's job under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement is to
determine whether the countermeasures proposed by the complainant are
appropriate. Footnote 10 of the article clarifies by saying: "This expression
is not meant to allow countermeasures that would be disproportionate in
light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are
prohibited."' 73 The arbitrator's decision at this stage is only to determine if
the concessions requested are 7a4ppropriate and equivalent to the level of
"nullification or impairment."
The United States took the position that the countermeasures proposed
by the European Communities were not appropriate because they were
disproportionate to the trade impact of the inconsistent measure on the
European Communities. 175 The United States interpreted Article 4.10 of
the SCM Agreement as requiring countermeasures not be disproportionate
to the trade impact of the violating measure on the complaining
Member. 76 The United States also considered that, in this instance, the
171. The United States argued that it is traditional to allow a transitional period of
time for subsidies to be withdrawn in order that companies who have entered into
contractual arrangements based on the existence of those subsidies not be unduly
punished. The FSC repeal act gave an indefinite extension to contracts in existence as of
January 1, 2002, and the U.S. agreed that as to those transactions, the FSC Repeal act did
not apply. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement requires prohibited subsidies to be
withdrawn "without delay", and provides that the panel will specify an appropriate timeperiod. The panel stated that the subsidies were to be withdrawn "without delay." See
ETI Appellate Report, supra note 65, § X.
172. The United State initiated the proceedings under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. Article 22.6 of the DSU provides in relevant part:
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request,
shall grant authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30
days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by
consensus to reject the request. However, if the Member concerned objects to
the level of suspension proposed,. . . the matter shall be referred to [binding]
arbitration.
DSU, supra note 65, at 1240.
173. Art. 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, supra note 6, states: "In the event the
recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period specified by the
panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel's report or the
Appellate Body's report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member
to take appropriate 9 countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the
request."
174. DSU, supra note 65, art. 22.7.
175. ETI Panel Report, supra note 98, at para. 15.
176. Id. at paras. 16-57.
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amount of the subsidy can and should be used as a "proxy" for the trade
impact of the measure. 7 7 The United States estimated the total value of
the subsidy at $4,125 million for the year 2000, and suggested that,
allocating to the European Communities its share of that amount,
in a maximum amount of $1,110 million would be
countermeasures
78
appropriate.1
The European Communities countered that its proposed countermeasures
corresponded to the value of the subsidy, and that this amount was
"appropriate" within the meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.
In the E.C.'s view, "Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement sets out a
unique benchmark for countermeasures in response to violations of a
particular provision of the SCM Agreement-namely Article 3 .' 179
Further, the European Communities argued that "Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement allows for countermeasures which will induce compliance,
and in this instance, countermeasures in the amount of the value of the
subsidy to be withdrawn are appropriate." 180 The European Communities
requested an authorization to take countermeasures by suspending
concessions in the amount of $4,043 million. This was the dollar amount
believed by the European Communities to have been spent by the
United States in support of the subsidy.
The Arbitration Panel determined that Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement
means that: "a Member is entitled to act with countermeasures that
properly take into account the gravity of the breach and the nature of
the upset in the balance of rights and obligations in question. This
cannot be reduced to a requirement that constrains countermeasures
to trade effects."1 81 The parties were in agreement regarding the type
177. Id. at para. 62.
178. Second Written Submission of the European Communities, United StatesTax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
the European Communities, at para. 19, WT/DS108/RW Annex C-2, at para. 4 (Feb. 27,
2001). In its first submission, the United States had initially estimated the actual value
of the subsidy at a lower figure. However, it subsequently re-evaluated that amount to
take account of certain E.C. arguments concerning the relevant elements for the
calculation. The amount cited here is the U.S. figure for the amount of the subsidy as
adjusted to take account of the coverage of the subsidy and the shift to the ETI Act. A
more detailed analysis of the relevant factors and figures can be found in Annex 1.
179. Second Written Submission of the European Communities, United StatesTax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
the European Communities, at para. 19, WT/DS108/RW Annex C-I, para. 22 (Feb. 27,
2001).
180. Arbitrator Decision, supra note 2, at para. 3.2.
181. Id. atpara. 5.61.

of countermeasures
to be instituted, it was only the amount that was in
82
dispute.'
The Arbitration Panel stated in support of its decision that:
Once such a measure is in operation, its real world effects cannot be separated
from the inherent uncertainty that is created by the very existence of such an
export subsidy. The measure is, by its very nature, inherently destabilizing.
This is its essential character and it is reflected in the fact that the measure is per
se prohibited. In this particular case, moreover, the subsidy at issue, the
FSC/ETI scheme, is a measure which is extensive in its application and, indeed,
is potentially available to a very wide range of goods for export. It is not at all
like a product- or even a sector-specific measure with, e.g., a set rate or
quantum of funds. It is a highly complex
83 and comprehensive export subsidy
being applied to a multiplicity of firms.

In the Panel's view, each dollar of subsidy is as much a breach of U.S.
obligations as any other dollar. "It is an erga omnes obligation owed in
its entirety to each and every Member" and cannot be considered to be
"allocatable" across the Membership. 184 Otherwise, the Member concerned
would be only partially obliged in respect of each and every Member,
85
which is manifestly inconsistent with an erga omnes per se obligation.
Therefore, "the United States has breached its obligation to the European
Communities in respect of all the money that it has expended, because
such expenditure in breach-the
expense incurred-is the very essence
86
of the wrongful act.','
The arbitration panel determined that the balance of the rights and
obligations between Members of the WTO could only be properly redressed
through full compliance with the DSB's recommendations, i.e., in this
case, a complete withdrawal of the unlawful subsidy. "Countermeasures
merely offer a temporary and imperfect solution to the persisting
violation, which
in no way reduces the need to comply or substitutes for
87
compliance."1
XVIII. CONCLUSION

The WTO was designed primarily to promote and safeguard free
trade, and through free trade to increase peace in the world and the

182. Id. at para. 6.1.
183. Id. at para. 6.8.
184. Id. at para. 6.10.
185. Id.
186. Id. "One of the arbitrators wishes to stress that this and the following
paragraph should not be read to mean that, without regard to the particular circumstances
of individual cases, the total amount of the subsidy would be a universally and generally
applicable standard at all times." Id. at para. 6.10 n.74.
187. Id. at para. 6.10 n.72.

[VOL. 5: 503, 2004]

Fishingfor Rainbows
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

standards of living of the world's people. 188 The WTO is an organization
based on rules that the United States played a major role in establishing.
In playing a major role in the establishment of the WTO, the United
States showed its commitment to free trade and the need for an
international institution to limit the protectionist forces that benefit only
a few in favor of a system of free markets for the benefit of everyone.
In the ETI case, the WTO has operated exactly as it was designed to operate. It
correctly labeled ETI as an export subsidy and determined that the continued
operation of ETI was inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations. Any other
decision would have struck a blow for protectionism and undermined the
credibility of a major international institution that serves America's long-term
economic189and political interests and the long-term interests of its trading
partners.

According to free trade theorists, "export subsidies benefit the recipients
190
at the expense of the general population and the national economy."'
"[U]nbridled and competing national subsidies can undermine world
prosperity." 191 Since the concentrated interests of producers are politically
more powerful than the diffuse interests of consumers, it is easier for
governments to go along with and protect industry groups rather than to
promote free trade. A major purpose of GATT was to discipline
protective import policies because of this behavior.
The 1930s experience with export subsidies as well as with competitive
devaluation, which has the effect of a general export subsidy and import
surcharge, apparently convinced the GATT founders that export subsidies
exacerbate international political tensions and should be eliminated, Though
consumers in the importing country gain from export subsidization by other
nations, domestic-producer groups in the importing countries are forced to
curtail output and incur a producer-surplus loss.... The view that domestic
producers are somehow more entitled to domestic compared to foreign markets
is still widely held by the general public. Thus, in the case of export subsidies,
it was not necessary for the founders of the GATT to implement their
international political objective with regard to this distortion only gradually (as
with tariffs) and export subsidies were banned outright. 192

188. The World Trade Organization, 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/l0bene/lObO0 e.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
189. Michael, J. McIntyre, How the United States Should Respond to the ETI
Controversy, TAX NOTES, May 20, 2002, at 1251, 1253.
190. Id.
191.
HUFBAUER &ERB, supra note 15, at 8.
192. ROBERT E. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 86
(1980), quoted in HUFBAUER & ERB, supra note 15, at 8.

If this theory is correct, then the WTO decision against the U.S.
government will actually advance the best interests of the American
public and the American economy if it leads to the outright repeal of the
ETI.
In October of 2003 the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee each passed bills that would repeal the
FSC/ETI scheme. 93 One of the few similarities in the bills, the House
version called the American Jobs Creation Act of 2003, and the Senate's
the Jumpstart our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, is the use of a threeyear phase in for the repeal. The slow phase-in was immediately challenged
by the European Union's Pascal Lamy. A firm date for sanctions to start
was set for December 15, 2003, and then moved to March 1, 2004, if the
FSC/ETI scheme is not repealed. 194 President Bush's recent repeal of
tariffs on imported steel may buy Congress a little more time to come up
with a solution that is palatable to the European Union.
Of the options available to Congress, only the full repeal of ETI without
any replacement is consistent with free trade and offers Congress a
complete and honest solution to the ETI problem. It is unlikely that a
new drafter will be able to create a new export subsidy that will continue
to provide the same benefits currently provided under the ETI scheme
and still pass muster with the WTO's dispute settlement body. Given
the political realities of instituting major tax reform legislation, it is
unlikely that a complete overhaul of the U.S. system could be accomplished
in the limited time left, and even then it would be subject to new
challenges before the WTO by the Europeans. The ETI should be repealed
in order for the United States to satisfy its obligations under international
law and maintain its position as a leader of the free-trade movement.
Any alternative mechanism for stimulating exports, even one that is
acceptable to the WTO, will distort trade patterns without increasing
U.S. jobs or strengthening the U.S. economy. The best course of action
for Congress is to stay the free trade
course that the United States
95
charted more than a half-century ago.1
STUART SMITH

193. H.R. 2896, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); S. 1637, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
194. Edward Alden, Tariff Deadline Looms as Lamy arrives in US, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 26, 2004.
195. See McIntyre, supra note 189, at 1251.

